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A Prolegomenon to Any Future 
Restatement of Privacy* 
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.† 
INTRODUCTION: THE ALI AND PRIVACY RIGHTS 
The American Law Institute (ALI) has played an 
important, indeed crucial, role in the advancement of privacy 
rights. Most notably, the ALI advocated for the repeal of anti-
sodomy laws1 almost a full half century before the Supreme 
Court’s landmark ruling in Lawrence v. Texas2 held such 
enactments to be unconstitutional.3 As Professor Bill Eskridge, 
Jr. notes, the ALI “had in 1955 voted to exclude consensual 
sodomy from the Model Penal Code (which the Institute 
ultimately adopted in 1962).”4 The ALI’s reasoning for this 
decision “was that consensual sodomy laws inevitably 
engendered police corruption and arbitrary enforcement and 
 
 *  © 2014 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. All Rights Reserved. 
 † John S. Stone Chair, Director of Faculty Research, and Professor of Law, 
University of Alabama School of Law. With thanks to Professor Anita Bernstein, for 
both organizing and inviting me to participate in the Restatement of . . . symposium, 
and to the American Law Institute and Brooklyn Law School for supporting the event. 
Thanks also to the other presenters and attendees, who generously offered very helpful 
and constructive comments on this Article; my contribution reflects the benefit of their 
ideas and suggestions. I would like to acknowledge the support of the University of 
Alabama Law School Foundation, which provided generous research support for my 
work on this project (in the form of a summer research grant). I also wish to thank the 
Lewis & Clark Law School for hosting me as a visiting scholar in residence during the 
summer of 2013, while I was working on this project. As always, any and all errors and 
omissions are my responsibility alone. 
 1 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 207.5 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Family Law 
Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 
GEO. L.J.1881, 1926 (2012) (observing that “the drafters of the Model Penal Code were not 
inclined to criminalize conduct that pleased its perpetrators and did not harm other persons, 
and they did not care that such conduct violated some natural law ideal” and noting that 
“the final version of the Code, ratified by the ALI in 1962, decriminalized consensual 
fornication, adultery, sodomy, and cohabitation”). 
 2 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 3 See id.at 562, 577-79. 
 4 William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Marriage Cases—Reversing the Burden of 
Inertia in a Pluralist Constitutional Democracy, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1785, 1798 (2009). 
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that invading people’s private consensual sexual activities did 
not advance the public interest.”5 
So too, the ALI promoted the liberalization of abortion 
laws over a decade before the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe 
v. Wade.6 As one commentator observed, “Although there has 
been continued agitation for abortion law reform or repeal in 
this country since at least the 1920s, the modern abortion-
rights movement generally traces its origins to 1959, when the 
American Law Institute (ALI) published its proposed revisions 
to existing state abortion laws.”7 
In light of these tremendously important contributions 
to the development and protection of privacy rights in the United 
States, it would be fair to say that although the ALI has never 
undertaken to create a formal Restatement of the Law of Privacy, 
the organization has been at the forefront of advancing and 
securing privacy for many years. Both of these earlier law reform 
proposals were, at least in the context of their times, strikingly 
bold. Indeed, it has always been a hallmark of the ALI to ask and 
answer hard questions—and to refuse to simply credit the 
argument that “this is how things are” as a persuasive rationale 
for maintaining particular legal rules and practices.8 
In this article, I will sketch some of the problems and 
issues that would confront an effort to create a Restatement of the 
Law of Privacy. In some important respects, the ALI’s reform 
efforts aimed at securing the repeal of state criminal laws 
regulating private sexual conduct and abortion were substantially 
easier to address—notwithstanding the controversial nature of 
the underlying subject matter—than the many and varied legal 
 
 5 Id.; see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY 
LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861–2003 118-24 (2008) (describing and discussing the ALI’s 
important role in promoting the repeal of anti-sodomy laws). 
 6 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The ALI’s draft of the MODEL PENAL CODE, issued in 1959, 
called for substantial liberalization of abortion regulations, to permit legal abortions (1) if 
necessary to protect the life or health of the mother, (2) if a pregnancy was the result of 
either rape or incest, or (3) if the gestating fetus was likely to suffer from significant birth 
defects. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959). 
 7 Brian W. Clowes, The Role of Maternal Deaths in the Abortion Debate, 13 
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 327, 328 (1993). 
 8 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 
457, 469 (1897). Justice Holmes famously argued that: 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was 
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds 
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply 
persists from blind imitation of the past. 
Id.; see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(citing and quoting to Holmes on this point). 
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and policy questions surrounding the concept of privacy more 
generally. One has only to look at contemporary newspaper 
headlines to see that the issue of privacy, in 2014, presents 
myriad complexities.9 Whether you are concerned about Google 
Earth filming your street and home or the National Security 
Agency snooping on whom you call on your cell phone and what 
websites you visit, privacy issues have cross-cutting and 
polycentric attributes that render them difficult to collect, 
synthesize, and restate. 
The ALI presently has a principles project underway on 
privacy and data protection, but even this project faces serious 
difficulties because of the transnational nature of data flows. 
Simply put, a privacy regime limited to the United States will 
not be sufficient to prevent or deter the collection and 
dissemination of personal data in the wider world. 
To facilitate the successful completion of a Restatement of 
Privacy, the ALI must effectively address two major problems. 
First, the concept of privacy would need to be defined with 
greater precision. At present, privacy lacks clear contours and 
meaning.10 As Professor James Q. Whitman has observed, 
“[H]onest advocates of privacy protections are forced to admit 
that the concept of privacy is embarrassingly difficult to 
define.”11 We would have to agree on the discrete interests that 
fall under the rubric of privacy before we could seek to restate 
the field. Second, and to a degree not present in most other 
areas of the law, successfully securing privacy interests would 
require transnational cooperation.12 Restating privacy law, at 
least in the context of data protection and the privacy torts, 
cannot be solely a domestic affair. 
I do not suggest that it would be impossible to create a 
Restatement of privacy; I do believe that such a project would 
 
 9 See, e.g., Ron Nixon, Postal Service Is Watching, Too: Outside of All Mail Is 
Recorded, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2013, at A1, A16 (describing high-tech spying operations 
conducted by the U.S. Postal Service, which include photographing and storing “the exterior 
of every piece of mail that is processed in the United States—about 160 billion pieces last 
year”). There is no judicial review or oversight of the use of the data gathered by the USPS. 
See id. Of course, government spying efforts are only one piece of the puzzle; the increased 
use of networked computers has created vast opportunities for private companies to collect, 
store, and sell personal data too. See, e.g., Julia Angwin & Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, 
Google’s iPhone Tracking, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 17, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052970204880404577225380456599176.html (describing and discussing 
Google’s practice of “bypassing the privacy settings of millions of people using Apple 
Inc.’s Web browser on their iPhones and computers”). 
 10 See infra notes 13-23 and accompanying text. 
 11 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus 
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1153 (2004). 
 12 See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. 
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be very difficult. In the balance of this article, I will explore 
and explicate these themes. 
I. TOWARD A RESTATEMENT OF PRIVACY LAW: THE 
PROBLEM OF DEFINING “PRIVACY” 
The current absence of a Restatement of the Law of 
Privacy should not be entirely surprising. Privacy is a protean 
concept that seems to mean everything—and nothing—at the 
same time. In a previous work, I have explored in some detail 
the ambiguity of privacy—both in U.S. law and transnationally.13 
Although I will not repeat my argument in full, some of the main 
points have immediate relevance here. 
A comprehensive and effective Restatement of privacy 
would, as an initial matter, have to establish a persuasive 
working definition of precisely what interests fall within its 
rubric. Given the difficulty of this definitional project, it might 
well be easier, and perhaps even more effective, to disaggregate 
privacy interests and only address discrete privacy issues incident 
to other Restatements. Under this approach, privacy is not 
restated, nor in need of restatement as such, because it does not 
really constitute a discrete and self-contained area of law, like 
torts, property, or contract. For example, Prosser’s privacy torts 
could be left in the Restatement of Torts;14 privacy issues in the 
workplace could be addressed in the Restatement of Employment 
Law; search and seizure law incident to police law, and the rules 
governing reproductive rights would be located elsewhere—
wholly separate and distinct from Restatement rules governing 
data protection and privacy in the workplace. Continuing that 
idea, a Restatement of consumer law could include data 
protection protocols for web-based transactions, but would not 
address the privacy torts. And so forth. In other words, rather 
than attempt to create an independent law of privacy, privacy 
could simply be disaggregated and assimilated into other 
substantive areas of the law. Thus, this approach would avoid the 
difficulty of articulating and applying a more concrete and 
functional definition of privacy. 
Although this potential solution to the problem of privacy 
initially might seem quite promising, I am not convinced that it 
presents a viable solution. We speak of privacy and privacy 
 
 13 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Polysemy of Privacy, 88 IND. L.J. 881 
(2013). I am presently at work on a book-length treatment of the concept of privacy, from a 
comparative law perspective, forthcoming from Oxford University Press in 2015 or 2016. 
 14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A–E (1977). 
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interests in our regular everyday lives and the concept plays a 
central role in contemporary human rights jurisprudence in the 
United States.15 Privacy is a concept with tremendous social, 
political, moral, and even economic salience. To pretend that 
privacy qua privacy does not exist would probably not 
constitute a workable solution in the long run. If we cannot 
slay the privacy hydra, then we must learn to live with the 
privacy hydra. 
Toward this end, we should start by identifying and 
explicating those interests that, properly understood, come within 
the rubric of “privacy.” I will not attempt a comprehensive listing 
of privacy interests here. But in the United States, privacy 
encompasses readily identifiable interests, such as freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, data protection, and 
Prosser’s famous basket of torts rights,16 including intrusion upon 
seclusion, false light, public disclosure of private facts, and 
appropriation of personality.17 In the United States, we also tend 
to assimilate fundamental liberty interests associated with the 
most important life choices into the concept of privacy.18 
The concept of privacy is no less broad, or dense, than 
the concept of “property,” another legal construct used to define 
and protect myriad related, but distinct, legal interests.19 An 
important difference exists, however, between privacy on the 
one hand, and property on the other. In both the United States 
and the wider world, we seem to have worked out a reasonably 
choate list of things that constitute “property” and we have 
general transnational agreement about what does—and does 
not—constitute a legitimate property interest. Because a 
reasonably broad global consensus exists regarding the content 
 
 15 See infra notes 38-53 and accompanying text. 
 16 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). For a thoughtful 
discussion of Prosser’s contribution to privacy as tort, see generally Neil M. Richards & 
Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887 (2010). 
 17 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A-E (1977); see also Krotoszynski, 
supra note 13, at 882-88. 
 18 See Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 882, 906-07. 
 19 Interestingly, the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY has been divided 
into different sections, so although property presents a more unified field of law than 
privacy, the drafting committee has decided that dividing the subject would bring 
greater coherence to the restatement effort. Thus, the restatement of property law 
spans four separate and distinct subfields: the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY 
(LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW) (1977), the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY 
(MORTGAGES) (1997); the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) (2000); 
and the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS) 
(2013). For an instructive discussion of how nomenclature and descriptive divisions 
matter in property law, see generally Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: 
Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (2003). 
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and scope of property rights, securing these interests effectively 
should be considerably easier than securing privacy interests.20 
Simply put, privacy is a concept that is more locally situated 
than property; accordingly, domestic understandings of privacy 
vary more widely than do domestic understandings of property. 
Local culture strongly informs and shapes the articulation and 
protection of privacy interests with particular legal systems. 
Other definitional interests also would have to be 
addressed and resolved in framing the scope of a Restatement of 
privacy. For starters, privacy straddles, indeed criss-crosses, the 
public/private law dichotomy.21 By this, I mean that privacy rights 
involve expectations and demands running against both the state 
and non-state actors.22 We certainly expect the government to 
respect our privacy, but we should be equally concerned about our 
privacy vis-à-vis each other and private corporations.23 
Google and Microsoft present as much of a threat to 
privacy as non-disclosure24 as the local city government (and 
 
 20 The nature of property also makes effective regulation easier—although I 
should not overstate this point. Intellectual property, which need not be tangible, 
presents some of the same difficulties as privacy. Tangible property, by way of contrast, 
exists within only one jurisdiction. Accordingly, the ability to make and enforce 
property regulations can be accomplished with reasonable efficacy. 
 21 See Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 
U. PA. L. REV. 1423 (1982); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1368-69 (2003) (noting that many government functions are 
being delegated to nominally private entities and that “[p]rivatization is now virtually 
a national obsession”). 
 22 See David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 864, 884-86 (1986) (discussing the state action doctrine and its potential 
relevance to establishing obligations on government to regulate private action); Ronald 
J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of Constitutional 
Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302 (1995) (discussing 
and critiquing the state action doctrine’s relevance to limiting the scope and effect of 
constitutional rights). 
 23 See generally Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. 
REV. 1405, 1412-16 (1986) (arguing that, in the context of free speech, the power of 
private companies to censor or restrict speech can be every bit as harmful to the 
marketplace of ideas—perhaps even more harmful—than government efforts at 
censorship). Professor Fiss suggests that the use of government regulatory power could 
actually enhance, rather than degrade, the marketplace of ideas. He suggests that 
“[j]ust as it is no longer possible to assume that the private sector is all freedom, we can 
no longer assume that the state is all censorship.” Id. at 1415. The same basic 
argument holds true with respect to securing privacy interests against large, 
monopolistic corporations as well. Government regulation of entities like Google, 
Microsoft, and Facebook might well enhance personal freedom rather than inhibit it—
especially with respect to vesting effective control over personal information and data 
in those who use the platforms that these companies provide. 
 24 One could also characterize this interest as “informational privacy,” that is, the 
ability to control the gathering and dissemination of personal information, whether by the 
government or other persons. See R. v. Cole, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34, para. 42 (Can.) (“Our concern is 
thus with informational privacy: ‘[T]he claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to 
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probably more). Monopolistic or oligopolistic corporations that 
collect, store, and sell personal data on a massive scale likely 
present a serious, but largely unaddressed, threat to privacy as 
non-disclosure in the United States. At the same time, 
however, privacy rights certainly involve expectations running 
against the state as well. Thus, unlike tort, contract, or foreign 
relations law, a comprehensive and universal Restatement of 
privacy law would need to expressly address privacy standards 
for both government and non-government actors. 
An additional difficulty would involve how best to create 
and define privacy rights. Are these primarily individual rights 
or are they collective rights? Or perhaps both? Do we think 
privacy protections are primarily designed to protect an 
individual’s interest in non-disclosure and autonomy? Or should 
privacy rights, properly conceived, be thought of in terms of 
groups that might have collective expectations of privacy (such as 
students, office workers, or journalists)?25 To provide another 
concrete example, one could think about privacy in the workplace 
as being about the status of workers as a group or, 
alternatively, about the rights of individuals who happen to be 
in a workplace. As I have previously noted, “in the United 
States more often than not we tend to frame human rights in 
terms of the individual rather than the group.”26 
The conceptualization of privacy rights as being individual 
or collective could have important implications for their scope. For 
instance, in the area of free speech jurisprudence, the Supreme 
Court has tended to create context-specific rules for speech—thus, 
the free speech rights of public school students27 and public 
employees28 are not the same as those of an angry proselytizer 
speaking from a soap box located on a public sidewalk or in a 
park.29 Government employees as a class, for example, possess 
significantly degraded free speech rights within the workplace.30 
I suppose that theorizing privacy rights in terms of groups 
rather than individuals need not necessarily imply reduced rights 
 
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others’” (quoting R v. Tessling [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, para. 23 (Can.))). 
 25 See Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 910-13. 
 26 Id. at 911. 
 27 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 28 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 29 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011); Forsyth County v. Nationalist 
Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Hague v. 
C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
 30 Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011); Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
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for those in groups (such as government workers in the free 
speech context), but this could well be how matters would come to 
rest. More absolute rights, drawn around the individual, without 
regard to the particular context at issue, might better secure 
privacy interests against government abridgment. On the other 
hand, government would likely resist broader privacy protections 
in the context of schools, government workplaces, and the like 
precisely because it would claim a managerial need for snooping.31 
Other conceptual difficulties would have to be addressed. 
For example, in the jurisprudence of many European domestic 
constitutional courts, and also the European Court of Human 
Rights, it is possible to be “private in public.”32 In other words, the 
fact that one happens to be in a public place does not 
automatically defeat a claim of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.33 In the United States, our jurisprudence generally 
rejects out of hand the notion that one can be private in 
public.34 We could certainly maintain this position with respect 
to a purely domestic Restatement of privacy, but such an 
approach would complicate the creation of a more global 
consensus about the proper meaning and scope of privacy 
rights. For privacy protections to effectively protect our 
personal data, some sort of transnational system of regulation 
will probably be essential. 
A more generalized problem is the interplay of privacy 
with commitments to expressive freedom—particularly the 
freedom of speech and of the press. In the United States, we 
generally privilege expressive freedom over safeguarding privacy, 
human dignity, and personal honor. The Supreme Court’s 
relatively recent decisions in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.35 and 
 
 31 On the government as a manager and how that role could legitimately 
inform the potential scope of constitutional rights within the workplace, see Robert C. 
Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 153, 164-67 (1996). 
 32 See N.A. Moreham, Privacy in Public Places, 65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 606 (2006) 
(discussing the commonly held position in Europe that it is possible for a public official 
or public figure to possess a reasonable—and legally protected—expectation of privacy 
while in an otherwise public place or area). 
 33 See, e.g., Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] 2 A.C. 457 (H.L.) (appeal taken 
from Eng.). 
 34 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213, 1217-20 (2011). 
 35 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2668-72 (2011). For a thoughtful and highly persuasive 
discussion of the possible implications that a broad interpretation of the holding in Sorrell 
could have on government efforts (whether legislative or judicial) to protect privacy, see 
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of Privacy, 36 
VT. L. REV. 855 (2012). Professor Bhagwat argues that the broader implications of Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Sorrell could “have dramatic, and extremely troubling, 
implications for a broad range of existing and proposed rules that seek to control disclosure 
of personal information in order to protect privacy.” Id. at 856. 
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Snyder v. Phelps36 reflect this ordering of values. In both cases, 
expressive freedom trumped state law efforts to protect privacy.37 
II. THE SALIENCE OF PRIVACY IN THE UNITED STATES: WHY 
THE LAW OF PRIVACY MIGHT BE WORTH RESTATING 
Privacy’s salience, at least in the United States, arises in no 
small measure because of the weight and importance of the 
autonomy interests that the Supreme Court of the United States 
has brought under the privacy aegis. Simply put, we look to privacy 
to protect autonomy interests central to human self-definition and 
dignity, such as reproductive rights and the ability to enjoy some 
measure of sexual autonomy—at least between consenting adults, 
in private, and not for direct forms of remuneration. 
The joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey38 
provides an important and highly relevant illustration of the 
centrality of constitutional privacy as autonomy39 in U.S. 
human rights law: 
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating 
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child 
rearing, and education . . . . Our precedents “have respected the private 
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.” Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). These matters, involving the 
most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, 
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the 
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty 
is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters 
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under 
compulsion of the State.40 
In Casey, the concept of constitutional privacy relates 
directly to the freedom to make central decisions about our 
personal lives free and clear of state compulsion. Individuals have 
 
 36 131 S. Ct. at 1217-20. 
 37 See id. at 1218-20 (rejecting privacy justification for imposing liability for 
speech on a matter of public concern); Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668, 2672 (rejecting a 
privacy-based justification for a legal prohibition on the sale of physicians’ prescription 
data to pharmaceutical companies for use in marketing programs aimed at doctors). 
 38 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (joint opinion). 
 39 By “privacy as autonomy,” I mean the ability to exercise agency or control 
over important decisions central to one’s self-definition and happiness. See, e.g., R. v. 
Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 166 (Can.) (Wilson, J., concurring) (“Liberty, as was 
noted in Singh, is a phrase capable of a broad range of meaning. In my view, this right, 
properly construed, grants the individual a degree of autonomy in making decisions of 
fundamental personal importance.”). 
 40 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
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a constitutional right to “define one’s own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and the mystery of human life.” 
Of course, the authors of the joint opinion cannot mean 
literally what they seem to be saying. Moreover, subsequent 
cases, such as Washington v. Glucksberg,41 and Gonzalez v. 
Raich,42 demonstrate that concrete limits and exceptions cabin 
the scope of this constitutionally protected realm of individual 
liberty. To be clear, I am not suggesting that Justices O’Connor, 
Kennedy, and Souter—the authors of the Casey joint opinion—
erred in finding a constitutionally protected liberty interest that 
encompasses reproductive choice. On the other hand, Casey’s 
remarkably broad language does little to help clarify the actual 
metes and bounds of this constitutionally protected zone of 
personal autonomy. 
At least arguably, the Casey joint opinion’s broad but 
imprecise language about the centrality of human freedom and 
dignity both establishes the need for a Restatement of privacy 
and also the profound difficulty of undertaking the task. The 
problem with constitutional privacy, running all the way back 
to Lochner-era cases like Pierce v. Society of Sisters43 and Meyer 
v. Nebraska,44 is a lack of adequate specificity regarding how 
the conflicting values at issue—the right of the individual to be 
self-regulating in matters of central importance to happiness 
and identity on the one hand, and the right of the community, 
acting through democratically constituted institutions of 
government, to establish rules that permit peaceful coexistence 
over time, on the other—should be reconciled. 
Casey provides a salient example of the Supreme Court 
embracing privacy as a means of describing and delimiting 
fundamental liberty interests. Lawrence v. Texas45 provides 
another. Writing for the majority in Lawrence, Justice 
Kennedy argues: 
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The 
State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by 
making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty 
under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in 
their conduct without intervention of the government. “It is a 
 
 41 521 U.S. 702 (1997); see also Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
 42 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 43 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 44 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 45 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty 
which the government may not enter.”46 
This language reflects the same general framing device 
used in the Casey joint opinion—that the government may not 
legitimately “control the destiny” of human beings, at least insofar 
as private, consensual sexual conduct between consenting adults 
is at issue. But, as with Casey, the exact scope of this “realm of 
personal liberty which the government may not enter” goes 
largely undefined. 
To be sure, Justice Kennedy’s opinion does seem to place 
significant weight on the notion of privacy within one’s home or 
dwelling. He explains that: 
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government 
intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition 
the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other 
spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State 
should not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial 
bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom 
of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The 
instant case involves liberty of the person in both its spatial and 
more transcendent dimensions.47 
In that portion of the opinion, Justice Kennedy plainly invokes a 
tradition, reflected in the common law, that conveys autonomy 
on individuals when in their own home.48 But, even here, Justice 
Kennedy almost immediately discards this limitation in favor of 
endorsing broader, more open-ended language: “Freedom 
extends beyond spatial bounds,”49 and constitutionally protected 
liberty “presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of 
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”50 
The problem, obviously enough, is that these unrelated 
interests are quite disparate and canvass a great deal of wholly 
unrelated territory. Were the ALI to undertake an effort to 
restate the law of privacy, the discrete interests to be protected 
would need to be identified and described in much finer detail. 
The language in Casey and Lawrence reads quite nicely as 
poetry, but fails to provide adequate concrete guidance regarding 
 
 46 Id. at 578 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
847 (1992)). 
 47 Id. at 562. 
 48 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-66 (1969); see also Whitman, 
supra note 11, at 1211-19 (discussing the deep-seated tradition in U.S. law of relating 
legally protected privacy interests to “the sanctity of the home”). 
 49 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
 50 Id. 
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the inevitable balancing that privacy claims require.  More 
specifically, neither decision clearly addresses how lower federal 
and state courts should go about balancing an individual’s privacy 
claim against the government’s response that a particular 
regulation advances a sufficiently important interest in a 
reasonably tailored way to survive constitutional review.51 
Like Justice Hugo L. Black, we can all like our privacy as 
much as the next person, even if one person’s concept of privacy 
varies considerably from another person’s understanding of the 
concept.52 And, to borrow Justice Stewart’s infelicitous turn of 
phrase, perhaps we are to know privacy when we see it.53 In any 
event, any potentially successful attempt to restate privacy law 
comprehensively would require identifying with far greater 
precision precisely what rights and interests fall within the 
concept of privacy—and which do not. At the same time, 
however, the centrality and the persistence of privacy as an 
important legal construct suggest that an effort to better 
articulate precisely what privacy means could help bring 
needed clarity to an important area of the law. 
III. THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL APPROACH: AN EFFECTIVE 
RESTATEMENT OF PRIVACY WOULD REQUIRE 
TRANSNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON HOW BEST TO SECURE 
BOTH PRIVACY INTERESTS AND CONFLICTING VALUES 
SUCH AS FREE SPEECH AND PRESS RIGHTS 
At least in some important respects, a workable system 
of privacy protection will have to be transnational in scope if it 
is to secure privacy interests reliably and effectively against 
abridgment (whether by the state or non-government actors). 
For example, an effective data protection regime cannot rely 
solely on a single sovereign, unless the Internet can somehow 
be cabined within a single national jurisdiction. To be sure, 
 
 51 See AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND 
THEIR LIMITATIONS 75-78, 340-78 (Doron Kalir, trans., 2012) (discussing the judge’s 
inevitable task of balancing when constitutional rights come into conflict with 
legitimate social policies). 
 52 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I like 
my privacy as well as the next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government 
has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional provision.”). 
 53 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I 
shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be 
embraced within that shorthand description [of obscenity]; and perhaps I could never 
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture 
involved in this case is not that.”). 
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China’s successful efforts at censorship on a mass scale54 
suggest that it is possible to nationalize and police the content 
available to one’s citizens on the web. But in most democratic 
nations committed to the rule of law, official government 
censorship of this scope would be politically unthinkable (or so 
I would have thought, prior to the lack of much of a domestic 
public response to Edward Snowden’s highly troubling 
revelations about the NSA’s massive domestic spying 
programs).55 So too, if privacy law should afford some measure 
of protection against disclosure of private facts, it would be 
helpful to publishers of all stripes, and in all jurisdictions, to 
have a better sense of where to draw the line between matters 
of public concern and a subject’s legally protected private life. 
Most legal and policy questions do not require 
transnational agreement for a system of regulation to be 
effective. For example, a nation can make a more or less free 
choice regarding when to permit the lawful sale of alcohol or 
tobacco based on age. If a jurisdiction establishes a minimum 
age of 21 for the lawful purchase, possession, and use of these 
products, this legal rule will have no necessary effect on a 
neighboring polity’s decision to adopt 18 years of age instead. 
The decision of where to set the age of majority for these 
products is largely, if not entirely, local in effect and capable of 
effective enforcement on a local basis. 
 
 54 See Didi Kirsten Tatlow, U.S. Prism, Meet China’s Golden Shield, INT’L 
HERALD TRIB. (June 28, 2013, 3:10 AM), http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/ 
06/28/u-s-prism-meet-chinas-golden-shield/?_r=0 (noting that “Golden Shield is over a 
decade old, an overarching monitoring network spun by the state that encompasses the 
colloquially-named Great Firewall of Internet censorship”); see also Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski, Jr., The Irrelevant Wasteland: An Exploration of Why Red Lion Doesn’t 
Matter (Much) in 2008, the Crucial Importance of the Information Revolution, and the 
Continuing Relevance of the Public Interest Standard in Regulating Access to Spectrum, 
60 ADMIN. L. REV. 911, 919 n.27, 936-37 (2008) (discussing the censorship of the 
Internet in China and several other nations, including North Korea and Cuba). 
 55 See, e.g., Michael Birnbaum & Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Accused of 
Eavesdropping on German President, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2013, at A10 (noting that 
although Edward Snowden’s revelations had largely “settled in the United States” only 
a few months after their release, his revelations remained highly charged and 
politically relevant in Western Europe). Even a relatively modest proposal to improve 
the oversight powers of the FISA court produced predictable political responses and 
seems unlikely to be enacted. See Siobhan Gorman, Carol E. Lee, & Janet Hook, 
Obama Vows Spying Overhaul: NSA Leaker Snowden’s Revelations Hasten Call to 
Revamp Surveillance Court and Patriot Act, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 10, 2013, 5:40PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB40001424127887324522504579002653564348842 
(reporting on reforms proposed by the Obama Administration to NSA oversight by the 
FISA court and noting that the president’s proposed reforms “drew sharp responses 
from Republican lawmakers who suggested the president was retreating under 
political pressure”). 
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The same would be true with respect to setting a 
minimum age for voting in national elections—most nations 
use 18 as the age of voting majority, but this not universally 
true.56 In Austria, persons at least 16 years of age are entitled to 
vote in national, state, and local elections (but not in elections for 
the European Parliament, which requires that all electors be at 
least 18 years of age).57 As with the minimum age of majority for 
alcohol and tobacco products, one nation’s policy choice on this 
question will not significantly affect or impede another’s. 
However, given the interconnected and global nature of 
information technology systems, a single nation will be unable 
to regulate data flows beyond its own borders. Thus, for a 
system of privacy protection of personal data to be effective, 
some level of global consensus will be necessary. Data located 
in the cloud is arguably everywhere and nowhere at the same 
time. Certainly, it would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to 
determine the physical location of the data. So too, if a web 
page can be viewed anywhere in the world at any time, 
attempting to ascertain its “real” physical location would 
constitute an exercise in futility. 
Information captured and stored in one jurisdiction will 
not be subject to regulations made and enforced by a 
government somewhere else—even if the data relates to citizens 
of that jurisdiction. Privacy, at least with respect to control over 
the disclosure or non-disclosure of personal data, raises difficult 
questions about the potential efficacy of domestic regulatory 
efforts. In this field, going it alone will likely not produce 
acceptable results. The question of whether an effective national 
regulatory regime for data storage and transfer could be 
successfully enforced represents the second wave (with the first 
being the definitional problems associated with privacy as a 
legal construct).58 The transnational aspects of the problem of 
privacy regulation begin, but do not end, with the problem of 
data existing simultaneously within multiple jurisdictions. 
Conflicts between constitutionally protected rights of free 
expression and privacy are another area that would seem to 
 
 56 See Vivian E. Hamilton, Democratic Inclusion, Cognitive Development, and 
the Age of Electoral Majority, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1447 (2012) (arguing that the U.S. 
should follow the lead of several other democratic polities and lower the minimum 
voting age below 18). 
 57 Joshua Gans, Why It’s Time To Give Children The Right To Vote, FORBES 
(Apr. 20, 2012, 5:17 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/joshuagans/2012/04/20/its-time-
to-give-children-the-vote/. 
 58 See supra notes 13-24 and accompanying text. 
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require some form of transnational agreement and cooperation.59 
An exclusively local effort at restating, and renormalizing, 
privacy law would be insufficient because a blog post in 
Indianapolis can have serious reputational effects in Brisbane, 
Australia, or Frankfurt, Germany. Because a great deal of speech 
is no longer truly local, an exclusively U.S.-based effort to 
conceptualize privacy will not succeed in providing clear guidance 
to either publishers or those who trade in personal data. 
The different nomenclature used to afford protection to 
privacy interests also must be taken into consideration.60 In other 
democratic polities, like Germany, the nomenclature of privacy is 
different than in the United States.61 As Professor Whitman 
argues, “[c]ontinental privacy protections are, at their core, a form 
of protection of a right to respect and personal dignity.”62 
In fact, the word “privacy” simply does not appear in the 
German Basic Law (Germany’s constitution).63 Instead, the Basic 
Law conveys protection  for legal interests  such as “dignity,” “free 
development of the personality,” and “personal honor”;64 these 
concepts, individually and in conjunction, create and protect a 
sphere of personal autonomy and privacy.65 However, privacy 
lacks much constitutional salience as a legal construct in 
Germany. If one wishes to consider the concept of privacy in 
Germany, one must investigate judicial decisions implicating 
dignity, personal development, and honor.66 The law’s goals and 
 
 59 See Timothy Zick, The First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective: 
Toward a More Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 B.C. L. REV. 941 (2011); Timothy Zick, 
Falsely Shouting Fire in a Global Theater: Emerging Complexities of Transborder 
Expression, 65 VAND. L. REV. 125, 174 (2012). 
 60 See Whitman, supra note 11, at 1153-59. 
 61 See id. at 1160-64. 
 62 Id. at 1161. 
 63 See Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 906. 
 64 GRUNDGESETZFÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIKDEUTCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] 
[GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBI. I, art. 1(1) (Ger.) (“Human dignity shall be 
inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.”); id. art. 
2(1) (“Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar 
as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or 
the moral law.”); id. art. 5(2) (limiting the scope of protected expressive freedoms under 
the Basic Law when such limits arise by operation of “the provisions of general laws, in 
provisions for the protection of young persons, and in the right to personal honor”) 
(emphasis added). 
 65 Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 903-06; see Whitman, supra note 11, at 
1180-89 (discussing and describing the development and sources of “privacy” protection 
in Germany, which generally relate to laws aimed at protecting personal honor, 
reputation, and dignity). 
 66 See Whitman, supra note 11, at 1153-60 (discussing legal, cultural, and 
political differences in framing and protecting autonomy interests in the United States 
and Europe). As Professor Whitman notes, “[e]vidently, Americans and continental 
Europeans perceive privacy differently.” Id. at 1159. 
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objectives are quite similar in Germany as in the United 
States, but the precise means used to advance and achieve 
these goals is somewhat different.67 Any serious effort to create 
a general model, or template, for recognizing and protecting 
privacy interests would need to take careful account of the 
variation that exists in labeling these interests.68 
Moreover, these differences in nomenclature are not 
merely semantic; the labels used to describe protected autonomy 
interests reflect deep socio-jurisprudential commitments, not 
mere accidents of legal drafting.69 For example, Germany uses 
“dignity” in lieu of “privacy” precisely because the phrase implies 
a strong commitment to both individual and collective autonomy 
interests.70 In Germany, both individuals and groups have a 
constitutionally protected interest in human dignity.71 In 
contrast, privacy, by its very nature, reflects and incorporates a 
less communitarian ideal and reflects a legal order that 
conveys legal protection to individuals, not groups.72 
There is a significant potential upside to systematic 
consideration of these differences between and among legal 
systems. A comparative law approach to analyzing and 
restating privacy would yield important insights about how 
best to resolve difficult questions of public policy involving 
conflicting claims by the government and individuals about the 
proper scope of individual autonomy.73 I suspect that some 
questions will have easy and obvious answers—for example, 
most democratic societies do not tolerate the use of hard drugs, 
 
 67 Id. at 1219-21. 
 68 Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 916-18. 
 69 See Whitman, supra note 11, at 1171-1211 (discussing the normative and 
jurisprudential values that inform “privacy” protections in France and Germany and 
also noting the broader social and cultural values that helped to sustain and inform 
these legal constructs). 
 70 See Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 907. 
 71 Id. at 906-16; Whitman, supra note 11, at 1160-64. 
 72 See Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 906-16. 
 73 It bears noting that the ALI has used an empirical, comparative law 
methodology to help inform its law reform efforts before—and in the area of privacy to 
boot. When proposing the repeal of state and federal anti-sodomy laws, the ALI noted 
that many nations in Europe had already acted to decriminalize consensual sexual 
behavior between adults. See Yao Apasu-Bgotsu et al., Survey on the Constitutional 
Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 526-27 
(1986). The authors of this important survey, cited in Justice White’s unfortunate 
majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, see 478 U.S. 186, 192, 194 (1986), observe that 
the ALI “noted that such nations as France, Great Britain, Canada, Mexico, Italy, 
Denmark, and Sweden had repealed their sodomy statutes.” Yao, supra at 526. In this 
sense, then, I am simply suggesting that the ALI use this same empirical, comparative 
law methodology when addressing the myriad new privacy questions that technological 
capabilities, in both government and private hands, have created. See Greg Gordon, 
Surveillance Databases Could Be Massive, OREGONIAN, July 5, 2013, at A1. 
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such as heroin, even if an individual claims that heroin use is 
essential to her happiness and self-actualization. By way of 
contrast, the law governing search and seizure, data protection, 
and access to abortion varies widely from place to place, and 
from society to society. 
One final point merits both mention and consideration. 
Notwithstanding the protean nature of privacy, the concept 
retains tremendous cultural, legal, and political salience. 
Simply put, people have come to expect the law to protect 
privacy interests. Outside the United States, global outrage 
arose in response to the revelations unleashed by Edward 
Snowden’s leaking of classified information; this leaked 
information established that U.S. government intelligence 
agencies routinely engage in broad-based spying efforts on 
allies of the United States (such as Germany and France).74 
This global response provides concrete evidence that privacy, at 
least as non-disclosure with respect to government, has great 
transnational appeal. One U.S. intelligence program, called 
PRISM, seeks to collect, synthesize, and analyze virtually all 
communications transmitted over the Internet.75 In many 
important respects, the very existence of a program like PRISM 
renders the concept of privacy, if not meaningless, then 
certainly less meaningful than we previously thought it to be.76 
 
 74 See Michael Birnbaum, Allegations Imperil Cooperation with U.S. on Key 
Fronts, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2013, at A1 (discussing outrage in Europe over the NSA’s 
routine surveillance of government officials in Germany, France, the EU, and elsewhere 
in Europe); Birnbaum & Nakashima, supra note 55 (noting that “[r]evelations of NSA 
spying in Germany has caused major political uproar in the country this year, with 
investigations and fallout lasting long after outrage over Snowden’s revelations had 
settled in the United States” and also that “swift condemnation of the United States 
came from across the political spectrum in Germany”). 
 75 Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S. Intelligence Mining Data from Nine 
U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST, June 6, 2012, at A1; 
Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Taps in to Internet Giants, GUARDIAN 
(U.K.), June 6, 2012, at A1; see also Barton Gellman, U.S. Surveillance Architecture 
Includes Collection of Revealing Internet, Phone Metadata, WASH. POST, June 15, 2013, 
at A1. Of course, the United States is hardly alone in operating massive, secret data 
collection operations. See Steven Erlanger, France, Too, Is Sweeping Up Data, 
Newspaper Reveals, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2013, at A3. 
 76 An equally distressing point is the apparent failure of the federal judges 
sitting on the FISA court to take seriously their obligation to protect constitutional values 
(rather than serve as a virtual rubber stamp for government requests to gather vast 
amounts of private data). See Eric Lichtblau, In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers of 
N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2013, at A1, A15 (“In more than a dozen classified rulings, the 
nation’s surveillance court has created a secret body of law giving the National Security 
Agency the power to amass vast collections of data on Americans.”). The FISA court 
evidently has issued rulings on “broad constitutional questions” in a completely ex parte 
process, and with no public disclosure of its constitutional decisions. Id. 
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I am not at all sure that an ALI Restatement of privacy 
would restrain governments bent on violating our privacy and 
spying on us in ways that make the world imagined in George 
Orwell’s dystopian masterpiece, 1984, seem like our present 
lived reality. On the other hand, it does seem to be a 
particularly opportune moment to reconsider the concept of 
privacy in a sustained and thoughtful fashion. If those who 
believe in the importance and salience of privacy rights do not 
demand their effective protection under law—against both 
government and private entities—it seems almost certain that 
we will cease to enjoy them. 
A good way to begin working toward a Restatement of 
privacy would be for the ALI to constitute a transnational 
working group, including legal scholars from multiple 
jurisdictions, that could undertake an empirical project of 
identifying and classifying privacy interests within specific 
domestic legal systems. In other words, before we attempt to say 
what privacy should or could be, it would make sense to first 
understand what privacy is from a more global perspective. 
Rather than making bald normative claims about 
privacy, I would argue that a better approach would first seek 
to understand the ways in which the law already succeeds and 
fails in securing interests that fall within the ambit of privacy 
(or its German first cousin, dignity). At least initially, we 
should undertake an effort to understand privacy from the 
bottom up, rather than the top down. Such an approach would 
also help to facilitate forging a global legal consensus on how 
best to address privacy interests. 
CONCLUSION 
In some important respects, pinpointing discrete 
subjects related to privacy interests and addressing them 
incident to larger and broader restatement projects might 
constitute the best approach to restating the law of privacy. 
Rather than attempt to address the definitional and operational 
problems, one could simply seek to avoid them by locating 
privacy rules deeply within other domestic law subjects. Under 
this approach, the ALI should simply continue to do what it 
already has been doing—addressing privacy interests incident 
to Restatements of other, more general, areas of law. 
Nevertheless, we should pursue a bigger, bolder, and more 
unified approach to the question of privacy law. To the extent that 
law reform projects seek to bring order to areas of law that seem 
to lack focus, definition, and clarity, privacy law would appear to 
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be an ideal candidate for restatement. The fact remains that 
designing and implementing such a project would be difficult.77 
A comparative and empirical approach would undoubtedly 
shed light on the meaning and scope of privacy; both points of 
tangent and points of divergence would emerge from such an 
undertaking. To be clear, I am not suggesting that the United 
States should simply fall into lockstep behind other nations with 
respect to privacy law—whether the question at issue relates to 
search and seizure law, data protection, or reproductive rights. I 
do, however, think that careful consideration of how other 
democratic societies have addressed common problems might 
shed important, and non-obvious, light on how best to address 
these issues, both in the United States and more globally. 
At its best, of course, this is precisely what the ALI’s 
restatement projects attempt to do: synthesize legal 
understanding, not merely as part of a descriptive enterprise, but 
instead as part of an effort to improve and advance the 
underlying values that the law seeks to protect. A Restatement of 
privacy would be particularly difficult to accomplish, but it would 
also be particularly useful in advancing and improving the state 
of legal knowledge in this important field of law. 
 
 77 See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text. 
